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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000463

STATE FOR PM DAS LIKENS, PMAT AND NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/14
TAGS: [MOPS](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [IZ](#)
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES CEASEFIRE
TERMS WITH MOQTADA AL SADR BUT PM NOT ON BOARD

CLASSIFIED BY POL-MIL COUNSELOR RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR
REASONS 1.4 (A) AND (D).

¶1. (C) Muaffaq al Rubaie, reached at our initiative in the afternoon of August 13, said he was approaching agreement with an envoy of Moqtada al Sadr over a nine point peace plan (para 6 below.) Apparently Rubaie had never been able to meet with Sadr but met several times with his envoy. A ceasefire originally established only to facilitate the meeting has lasted most of the day. The nine-point plan appears to have numerous weaknesses including: agreement on a pull-back by Coalition Forces; no timeline for turning over control of the mosques to the Iraqi government; and an open-ended provision for security forces for Moqtada and his Lieutenants.

¶2. (C) Ambassador Negroponte, General Casey and Pol-Mil Counselor Neumann met with Prime Minister Allawi at 1600 hours. Allawi had not talked to Muaffaq since 0900 hours. He had not heard of the nine-point plan. Allawi said his instructions had been to tell Sadr he had to get his forces out of Najaf and disband them and Sadr could be allowed to enter the political process. Allawi said of the nine points, "that's too much." Allawi said he felt that Sadr was not serious and would not sign even these points. He believed Sadr was trying to drag out negotiations and that it wasn't in the government's interest.

¶3. (C) Allawi said that Iraqis are encouraged to move to the opposition by displays of weakness. This is what happened earlier with both the spring negotiations with Moqtada and Fallujah. He believes it important not to do that again.

¶4. (C) Allawi is waiting for the return today of Defense Minister Sha'lan, who is in Najaf. Allawi will contact us as soon as he hears from MOD. Allawi is very conscious that military operations have been interrupted and that time is being lost.

¶5. (C) Comment: We saw no evidence in Allawi's comments or behavior that Rubaie is negotiating the weaker approach of the nine points on instruction from his boss. Allawi said that he has not come under any serious political pressure from the other Shia religious leaders. Although Allawi does not like the fact that Vice President Jafari and the Dawa Party are calling for a cease fire (staking out some distance in case operations fail), he does not seem inclined to change his approach. SCIRI and its head Hakim have not said anything publicly. Allawi felt that news coverage of Najaf exaggerated the situation but did not seem bothered by that either.

¶6. (C) Following are the nine points as taken down orally by telephone.

Nine-Point Plan:

1) MNF-I pullout of Najaf and Kufa with the exception of Military Police Trainers;

2) SADR movement will work in constructive way with IIG to ensure security and stability in IQ and an honest election of a full, independent, elected government;

3) Legal Case referred to Majariyh (or tribal customs?);

4) Removal of all military, armed fighters and arms from whole governate with exception of para 6. Najaf city administration and city security is duty of IIG and ISF, including inner city and shrine;

5) JM - declare JM is not an armed militia but a popular ideological movement and, for the sake of preserving holy cities and keeping blood of our sons, request all members lay down arms and dissolve all C2 centers and military and security establishments and handover all non-personal arms. Members of this army can only carry arms under IQ law like other citizens;

6) Personal Security: MS has right to keep personal security for him, his offices and his lieutenants like any other distinguished dignitary in IQ political arena;

7) Holy Shrine:

i. administration by persons appointed by Majariyh;

ii. forbidden to use shrine for political purposes; especially for political offices and Friday sermons;

8) Release of all detainees and prisoners and those kidnapped in recent events (Note, this seems to refer to those detained in recent fighting only);

9) Establish joint committee for coordination and follow up.

17. (C) There are many things we do not like about these ideas. Among them are a pullout of Coalition Forces, the lack of a definite time line and no commitment to a public statement. MAS and his lieutenants have large numbers of "bodyguards" who have often been the main actors in illegal and bullying actions. We noted some of these deficiencies to Allawi, who agreed.

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